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ABSTRACT
Privacy recently emerges as a severe concern in deep learning, that is, sensitive data must be prohibited
from being shared with the third party during deep neural network development. In this paper, we
propose Morphed Learning (MoLe), an efficient and secure scheme to deliver deep learning data.
MoLe has two main components: data morphing and Augmented Convolutional (Aug-Conv) layer.
Data morphing allows data providers to send morphed data without privacy information, while
Aug-Conv layer helps deep learning developers to apply their networks on the morphed data without
performance penalty. MoLe provides stronger security while introducing lower overhead compared
to GAZELLE (USENIX Security 2018), which is another method with no performance penalty on
the neural network. When using MoLe for VGG-16 network on CIFAR dataset, the computational
overhead is only 9% and the data transmission overhead is 5.12%. As a comparison, GAZELLE has
computational overhead of 10,000 times and data transmission overhead of 421,000 times. In this
setting, the attack success rate of adversary is 7.9× 10−90 for MoLe and 2.9× 10−30 for GAZELLE,
respectively.
1 Introduction
In recent years, deep learning has become the driving force for many artificial intelligence applications such as image
classification [1], object detection [2], speed recognition [3], game intelligence [4], etc. However, there are also many
complaints about the substantially degraded performance of deep learning in real-world applications compared to that
achieved in lab environments [5]. One common reason for the unsatisfactory performance of deep learning is the
limited availability of high-quality training data, which is often caused by the privacy concern of the data. Take medical
imaging as an example, researchers always struggle for obtaining health and medical data as these data contain private
and sensitive information of patients; medical institutions are prohibited from sharing the data due to both legal and
ethical concerns. The same difficulties happen in all the applications where privacy is involved, and greatly hinder
adoptions of deep learning.
A general solution of the above challenge is to securely separate the privacy information from the data by paying extra
computational and performance penalties. Several implementations based on Homomorphic Encryption (HE) [6] or
Secure Multi-Party Computation (SMC) [7] have been proposed. However, these attempts suffer from the intrinsic
limitation of their underlying cryptography techniques, and introduce computational and data transmission overheads
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that largely correlated with the depth of the target neural networks. These overheads increase quickly with the depth of
deep neural networks [8, 9] and make these privacy-preserving schemes impractical in some scenarios such as training.
[10, 11] exploits property of the neural network itself and transmits low-level extracted features instead of the original
data. Although the feature transmitting methods can quarantine the original data, network performance is usually
compromised.
In this paper, we propose Morphed Learning (MoLe), a privacy-preserving scheme for efficient and secure delivery
of deep learning data that can be used in both training and inference stages. The main contributions of our work are
follows:
• We propose Data Morphing that performs linear shift of the original data in a multidimensional space. As the
first key component of MoLe, Data Morphing blends each element of the data matrix with other elements in
order to effectively hide sensitive information and prevent the morphed data from being recognized by human
observers.
• We propose Augmented Convolutional (Aug-Conv) layer that is composed of inverse transformation of data
morphing and the first convolutional layer of the original neural network. As the second key component of
MoLe, Aug-Conv layer can restore the performance degradation of the neural network incurred by the input
shift in data morphing.
• We verify the effectiveness of Aug-Conv layer by experiments. For CIFAR dataset [12], for instance, the
penalty of training performance for a VGG-16 network is within the margin of error when replacing the first
convolutional layer by Aug-Conv layer.
• Our theoretical security analysis on three attack schemes against MoLe show that the upper bound of adver-
sary’s success probability is low even with a strict privacy reservation requirement. Specifically, the attack
success probability for VGG-16 network is P = 7.9× 10−90.
• Our theoretical analysis proved that the computational and transmission overheads of MoLe are irrelevant to
the depth of the neural network or the size of the dataset. Specifically, applying MoLe on a VGG-16 network
for CIFAR dataset, the computational overhead and transmission overhead are 9% and 5.12% respectively.
The code to construct data morphing, Aug-Conv layer and to reproduce our experiments can be found at: https:
//github.com/NIPS2019-authors/MoLe_public
2 Related work
HE based data delivery schemes. The idea of HE is to compute on ciphertext and generate the ciphertext of result
which can then be decrypted to original result. The latest work [13] reported that performing inference on encrypted
MNIST dataset on a 16-core workstation took 2 hours, while performing inference on plain MNIST dataset on a
regular PC takes only a few minutes. Because of their high computational costs, the HE based schemes [14, 15, 13] are
applicable to only inference stage of deep learning, leaving the privacy information in training dataset unprotected. HE
based schemes also introduce constraints to the design of neural networks because both [15] and [13] require the range
of activation to be discretized or even binarized.
SMC based data delivery schemes. In SMC, multiple parties hold their own private data, and wish to jointly compute a
function which is dependent on data of all parties without each party sending its data to other parities. Following the idea
of SMC, distributed selective SGD was proposed [16] and used a centralized parameter server for gradient transferring.
However, recent study [17] discovered a security flaw in [16] as the parameter server is capable of recovering the
training data from the gradients. In addition, approaches combining HE and two-party computation (2PC), a subfield of
SMC, were proposed to provide privacy-preserving for both training and inference stages [18, 19, 20]. However, the
computational overhead for this kind of solutions is still high: the latest work [20] reported 421, 000× data transmission
overhead and more than 10, 000× execution time overhead, compared to non privacy-preserving method.
Feature transmission based data delivery schemes. Unlike cryptography based schemes, feature transmission based
schemes [10, 11] utilize the property of neural network itself. Instead of sending the original data, the data provider
computes several layers of the neural network and then send the extracted features. This process reduces the practicality
as the data provider needs to have computing capability to compute the network layers. Furthermore, features usually
have more channels than the original data, which increase data transmission overhead. To combat reverse engineering,
noises are applied to the features, resulting in the degradation of network performance: [11] reported 62.8% higher
error rate for CIFAR-10 dataset.
Differential privacy. Differential privacy is a popular technique of privacy-preserving for deep learning applications,
which usually serves the following two purposes: 1. Preventing adversary from identifying or recovering training
2
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data from a published network model [21]; 2. Enhancing security of collaborative training schemes against reverse
engineering on shared gradients [22]. The first purpose is for defending inversion attacks, which is not in the scope
of this paper; The second purpose suffers from a fatal security vulnerably as malicious participant can breach the
differential privacy using prototypical data generated by GANs [23]. For the above two reasons, we do not compare our
work with differential privacy based privacy-preserving schemes.
3 Preliminary
Terms and settings. We imagine a scenario in which entity A owns a database of sensitive user information and entity
B has a team of competent developers for deep learning applications. We use the term data provider to denote entity A
and the term developer to denote entity B. In this scenario, the data provider wants to outsource the development task
to the developer, and therefore he needs to transmit the data to the developer. To minimize the risk of potential user
privacy leakage, the data provider needs a method to hide the private information within the data. On the other hand,
the developer wishes the performance penalty or the number of network structural constraints incurred by the method to
be as minimum as possible.
The developer can be also a potential adversary who can be benefited from recovering the private information hidden in
the data. Since the data provider requires help from the developer to develop the deep learning applications, we can
safely assume that the data provide does not (need to) have adequate resource for large-scale neural network training.
Notations. Our notations follow two rules: 1. Bold font letters indicate matrices such as A, and Ax,y refers to the
element with coordinate of (x, y) in the A. The element at the top-left corner is considered to be the origin. x axis
indexes for rows and y axis indexes for columns. 2. Ki,j indicates a kernel for a convolutional layer, where i is the
index for input channels and j is the index for output channels. Combining the two rules, k(i,j),(x,y) stands for the
element with coordinate (x, y) in the Ki,j . All the coordinates of matrices in this paper use zero based indexing.
4 Method
MoLe consists of two main components which are named as data morphing and Aug-Conv layer, respectively. Data
morphing serves the data provider by providing human unrecognizable data transformation. The computation of data
morphing can be easily supported by regular CPUs. Aug-Conv layer fully compensates the performance degradation of
the neural network due to data morphing, and it is compatible to all convolutional neural network structures. Figure 1
depicts the process of utilizing MoLe for privacy-preserving. First, the developer trains his/her network on a public
dataset similar to the dataset of data provider’s, and sends the first trained convolutional layer to the data provider.
Second, the data provider generates morphing matrix and Aug-Conv layer, and uses data morphing to transform his/her
data; The developer replaces the first convolutional layer in his/her network, and then conducts training and inference
on the morphed data without modifying any other parts of the network. During the training process, the developer treats
the Aug-Conv layer as a fixed feature extractor similarly to pre-trained layers in transfer learning [24, 25]. In the rest of
this paper, we assume the following attributions of the first convolution layer: the shape of input data is m×m with α
channels, the shape of output features is n× n with β channels and the shape of convolutional kernel is p× p.
Figure 1: The process of utilizing MoLe for privacy-preserving.
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4.1 Data to row vector
Converting the first convolutional layer to an equivalent matrix multiplication is the basis of both data morphing and
Aug-Conv layer. Image to column matrix (im2col) is a trick to increase data parallelism for convolutional layer, and
it has been widely implemented in various deep learning frameworks [26, 27, 28]. The goal of im2col is to convert
convolutional layer from sliding convolutional kernels on the input data to matrix-matrix multiplication [29]. d2r is a
more extreme version of im2col that converts the convolutional layer to the product of a row vector and a large matrix.
d2r includes the following steps:
1. Unroll the input data D to row vectors. We first unroll the data of each channel by placing the row vector with a
smaller row index on the left, and then concatenate each channel vector by placing the channel with a smaller channel
index on the left. The dimension of unrolled data vector Dr is 1× αm2. A figure showing the unrolling process can be
found in our supplementary material.
2. Replace the convolution operation using a large matrix C the dimension of which is αm2 × βn2. We first initialize
C with zero elements. Then, for every weight k(i,j),(a,b), we assign Cx,y = k(i,j),(a,b) when (x, y) satisfies:
x = im2 + am+ cm+ b+ d
y = jn2 + cn+ d.
(1)
Here i ∈ [0, α) is the index of input channels; j ∈ [0, β) is the index of output channels; (c, d) is the coordinate of input
data and c, d ∈ [0,m− p+ 1); a, b ∈ [0, p) are the coordinate of kernels.
3. After multiplying Dr and C, we can get a row vector Fr with a dimension of 1× βn2. Following the reverse process
in step 1, the features that is identical to the output of the original convolutional operation can be reconstructed.
The process of using d2r to perform the convolutional layer operation can be found in supplementary material. In the
rest of the paper, a matrix with superscript r represents its d2r unrolled row vector.
4.2 Data morphing
Data morphing is designed to meet the following three requirements. 1) Equal-sized input and output data: This
requirement ensures that the data transmission overhead does not have a correlation with the amount of data; 2)
Adjustable computational cost: This requirement comes from the setting in section 3, as the data provider may have
limited computing resources; 3) Unrecognizable transformation: The output of data morphing should not be recognized
by human observers for privacy-preserving purpose.
Before data morphing, the original data D is unrolled to Dr using d2r. The data morphing operation can be described as:
Dr ·M = Tr. (2)
Here Tr is a row vector representing the morphed data. M is the morphing matrix, which is constructed as follows:
1. Construct core morphing matrix M′. M′ is an invertible matrix, and all of its elements are random and non-zero.
Assume the dimension of M′ is q × q, q should satisfy:
κ =
αm2
q
∈ Z+ . (3)
Here κ is called the morphing scale factor.
2. Construct M by diagonally scaling M′ to αm2 × αm2. The relation between the two matrices can be written as:
Mx,y =
®
M ′x−Nq,y−Nq, x ∈ [Nq, (N + 1)q) ∧ y ∈ [Nq, (N + 1)q)
0, else.
(4)
HereN satisfiesN ∈ N∧N < κ. A figure showing the process of diagonally scaling can be found in our supplementary
materials.
The morphing scaling factor κ controls the tradeoff between the computational cost and the effectiveness of privacy-
preserving, as shown in our supplementary materials. Since recent study [30] showed that modern desktop CPUs with
support of AVX instructions can compute simple matrix multiplications with decent efficiency, it is recommended for
desktop PC user to use a larger morphing core for better privacy. For lower-end compute devices such as embedded
systems, however, data morphing is also able to adjust the required computing power by paying the cost of privacy.
It is worth noting that the privacy-preserving feature offered by data morphing also requires secure storage of M. If the
developer is able to acquire M, he could recover the original data by Dr = Tr ·M−1, where M−1 is the inverse matrix
of M.
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4.3 Augmented convolutional (Aug-Conv) layer
The design of Aug-Conv layer also needs to meet three requirements: 1) Equivalent feature extraction from the morphed
data: It ensures that the network trained on the morphed data can achieve the same performance as that trained on the
original data. No modification on the network is needed; 2) Resistance to reverse engineering attack: The Aug-Conv
layer should not reveal the details of the morphing matrix M under reverse engineering attack. 3) Resistance to
reverse convolutional operation attack: Although the Aug-Conv layer needs to extract equivalent features, it should not
output identical features. Otherwise, the developer could recover the original data using the reverse operation of the
convolutional layer.
Inverse matrix multiplication. During d2r, the convolutional operation of the original first layer is converted to the
matrix product Fr = Dr · C. The matrix representation of the convolutional operation allows us to form the Aug-Conv
layer by matrix multiplication. The detailed steps are:
1. Calculate inverse morphing matrix M−1. When using d2r for convolutional operation, M−1 can restore the row
vector of morphed data Tr back to Dr, which can be represented as Tr ·M−1 = Dr.
2. Multiplying M−1 and C to form the Aug-Conv layer Cac as Cac = M−1 · C.
At this point, the features extracted by Aug-Conv layer from morphed data is identical to the features extracted by the
convolutional layer from original data, or:
Tr · Cac = Tr ·M−1 · C = Dr · C = Fr. (5)
The convolutional layer C is trained on another similar dataset, which works essentially as a low-level feature extractor
on that dataset. It can be reused for the dataset provided by the data provider, since low-level feature extractor for
similar tasks usually shows strong transferability [25] and therefore, meets the the first requirement of Aug-Conv layer.
Inverse matrix multiplication also meets the above second requirement, as it hides the detailed value of each element in
the inverse matrix M−1.
Channel order randomization. The Cac constructed from inverse matrix multiplication suffers the vulnerability of
inverse convolutional operation attack. As shown in Figure 1, C is provided by the developer and thus, he/she can also
obtain its inverse C−1. As a result, the developer can recover the original data by: Dr = Fr · C−1. To meet the third
requirement of Aug-Conv layer, we randomly shuffle the order of output feature channels. Assume F′ = rand(F) is
the output features with randomized channel order and rand is the randomization function, F′ and F are two sets of
equivalent features for the rest layers of the neural network. Here the shuffled channel order can be learned by the
rest layers in training. On the other hand, function rand prevents the developer from restoring the original data as
Dr 6= rand(Fr) · C−1, and therefore the third requirement is met. Similarly to M, the detailed channel order used for
rand needs to be stored securely.
The following two steps reduce the Cac’s vulnerability by implementing rand function in the Aug-Conv layer: 1)
Divide Cac into β groups and each group contains n2 continuous columns; 2) Randomly shuffle the order of the column
groups to construct Aug-Conv layer matrix with feature randomization.
4.4 Verification of the effectiveness of Aug-Conv layer
During the construction of Aug-Conv layer, we assume that the channel order randomization of features can be learned
in training process and would not harm the performance of the neural network. However, it is unclear whether this
assumption is true. Therefore we use experiments on CIFAR dataset to verify the effectiveness of Aug-Conv layer.
We trained the networks with the same hyperparameter settings: learning rate is 0.001, total training epochs is 300,
dropout probability is 0.5, batch size is 64, κ = 1 and learning rate decays by 0.5 for every 60 epochs. The results
are summarized in Table 1. The experimental results verify that Aug-Conv layer can help a network to achieve the
performance on morphed data similar to its original network on clean data. On the contrary, without the help of
Aug-Conv layer, network performance would drop significantly on morphed data.
5 Theoretical analysis on security and overhead
5.1 Threat model
In this subsection, two threat models are introduced for security analysis. The developer is considered to be a potential
Honest-but-Curious (HBC) adversary. HBC is a typical threat model for SMC where the adversary tries to discover as
much information from other parties as possible without violating the protocol. The HBC setting for MoLe means that
5
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Table 1: Aug-Conv layer effectiveness experiments
Dataset Data morphing Network Accuracy
CIFAR-10
No VGG-16 original 87.2%
Yes VGG-16 with Aug-Conv layer 87.4%
Yes VGG-16 original 15.8%
CIFAR-100
No VGG-16 original 55.9%
Yes VGG-16 with Aug-Conv 56.4%
Yes VGG-16 original 2.01%
the developer tries to recover the original data using the information sent from the data provider, including T and Cac.
The developer does not exploit other security breaches to access M−1, rand or D.
Additionally, Semi-Honest-but-Curious (SHBC) adversarial model is another stronger threat model in which the
developer is capable of acquiring several D-T pairs. The SHBC model allows further analysis on the situations where
the adversary managed to inject some of his/her own data into the data provider’s database beforehand.
5.2 Security analysis
In this subsection, the security of MoLe against three possible attack methods is quantitatively analyzed in the form of
attack success probability. The three attack methods are Brute Force Attack, Aug-Conv Reversing Attack and D-T Pair
Attack.
Definition 1. Unit l2-norm matrix. Any matrix A that satisfies |A|2 = 1 is a unit l2-norm matrix, where |A|2 denotes
the l2-norm of A.
We first scale Dr and each column in M to be unit l2 matrices in order to remove the measurement units of the
convolutional layer.
Brute Force Attack. The most straightforward attack to MoLe in HBC setting is to apply brute force attack on M.
Unlike encryption keys which would be useless even with one-bit difference, a close approximation of M can also
somehow recover recognizable dataDr as:
G ≈M⇒ G−1 ≈M−1 ⇒ Dr = Tr ·G−1 ≈ Tr ·M−1 = Dr. (6)
Here G is attacker’s approximation of M.
Lemma 1. Assume A is a given unit l2-norm matrix which has N elements, P1 is the probability of a random unit
l2-norm B that satisfies:
|A− B|2 ≤ d ≤ 1. (7)
The upper bound of P1 can be calculated by:
P1 ≤ 1
2
d(N−1). (8)
Lemma 2. Assume Erms(Dr,Dr) is the root mean square error between Dr andDr, N is the number of elements in
M, P2 is the probability of Erms(Dr,Dr) ≤ σ4√N . P2 satisfies:
P2 = P1(d = σ). (9)
Here P1 is the probability in lemma 1. The proof for lemma 1 and 2 can be found in our supplementary material.
Substitute lemma 1 into lemma 2, we can prove theorem 1 as:
Theorem 1. For original data Dr and recovered data Dr, M has N = (αm2κ )2 elements, the upper bound of the
probability PM,bf for Erms(Dr,Dr) ≤ σ4√N is:
PM,bf ≤ 1
2
σN−1 =
1
2
σ(
αm2
κ )
2−1. (10)
Here σ is defined as the privacy reservation Rp of MoLe, directing the maximum resemblance between Dr andDr
allowed by the data provider. Rp ∈ (0, 1). A larger Rp implies stricter requirement for privacy-preserving.
The adversary can also apply brute force attack on rand. There are β! possible randomization orders and therefore the
success probability for brute force attack on rand is Pr,bf = 1β! .
To give an intuitive understanding about the probabilities, we take CIFAR dataset as an example. Assume the data
provider requires Rp = 50% and chooses κ = 1, and the network used by the data provider is VGG-16[31]. In this
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setting, N = α
2m4
κ2 = 3072
2 and we can get PM,bf ≤ 2−30722 ≈ 2−9×106 , and Pr,bf = (64!)−1 ≈ 7.9× 10−90. It is
worth noting that Rp = 50% is already a very strict privacy-preserving requirement. The visualization result for Dr-Dr
pairs with different Rp can be found in our supplementary material.
Aug-Conv Reversing Attack. Aug-Conv reversing attack is another possible attack in HBC setting. The adversary
tries to factorize Cac to acquire M−1 and rand(C). Consider the channel with index of j in the output features, the
factorization process is to solve the equation set:
Cacy = M
−1 · Cy. (11)
Here Cacy and Cy denote the column vector with the index of y in C
ac and C, respectively, y ∈ [jn2, (j + 1)n2). In
equation set (11), M−1 is unknown to the adversary, introducing αm
2
κ unknown vector variables. In HBC settings, the
adversary does not have access to rand and therefore rand(C) is also unknown, introducing αβp2 unknown elemental
variables. The total number of unknown variables for the adversary is:
Nunk =
αm2
κ
+ αp2 >
αm2
κ
. (12)
The number of equations in equation set 11 is Neq = n2. To prevent the adversary from solving the equation set, Nunk
should be larger than Neq , and therefore κ should satisfy:
αm2
κ
≥ n2 ⇒ κ ≤ αm
2
n2
. (13)
Equation (13) gives the upper bound of κ. Additionally, even if the adversary includes more input channels into the
equation set, each channel can only provide αp2 independent equations while also introducing another αp2 unknown
variables. Thus, including more input channels does not help the adversary to solve the equation set.
The adversary can use equation set (11) to represent Neq elements in a column vector of M−1 by other elements, and
thus eliminating n2 independent elements in each column. The adversary can then use brute force attack to M−1 with
reduced independent elements to achieve a higher success probability PM,ar, which can be represented as:
PM,ar = PM,bf
(
N = (
αm2
κ
− n2)(αm
2
κ
) + αp2
)
≤ 1
2
σ(
αm2
κ −n2)(αm
2
κ )+αp
2−1. (14)
With the same CIFAR dataset and VGG-16 network setting adopted in the analysis of brute force attack, we can get
PM,ar ≤ 2−3072×2048 ≈ 2−6×106 . For more complicated tasks like ImageNet [32], PM,ar ≤ 2−7.5×109 which is
negligible due to the increase of m and n.
Combining PM,bf , Pr,bf and PM,ar, we can see that for most datasets and networks, Pr,bf is the upper boundary of
attacker’s success probability in HBC setting.
D-T Pair Attack. D-T pair attack applies only to the SHBC threat model. In this attack, we use the number of Dr-Tr
pairs required by the adversary to evaluate the security. In D-T pair attack, the adversary aims to calculate M′ by:
M′ = D−1 · T. (15)
Here D and T are constructed by stacking multiple Dr-Tr pairs correspondingly. We can see from equation (15) that
the required number of D-T pair equals the umber of rows in M′, which is q = αm
2
κ . In the same setting of brute force
attack, the attack requires 3,072 Dr-Tr pairs.
5.3 Overhead analysis
Computational overhead. The computational overhead introduced by MoLe can be divided into two parts. The first
part is on the data provider’s side and caused by the calculation of equation (2). The second part is on the developer’s
side and incurred by replacing C with Cac. We use the number of extra Multiply–Accumulate (MAC) operations to
measure the computational overhead. For the data provider, the total number of MAC operations Ocomp,dp that required
by each calculation of Equation (2) can be represented by:
Ocomp,dp = αq
2. (16)
Here multiplications with zero element are omitted. For the developer, the computational overhead Ocomp,dev is the
difference between the MAC operations needed by calculating Tr · Cac and Dr · C, which can be calculated by:
Ocomp,dev = αm
2βn2 − αp2βn2 = (m2 − p2)αβn2. (17)
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Table 2: MoLe versus other related methods (CIFAR-10 dataset and VGG-16 network)
Method Performancepenalty
Data transmission
overhead
Computational
overhead
Attack success
probability
MoLe 0 0.05× 0.09× 7.9× 10−90
SMC based[20] 0 421,000× 10,000× 2.9× 10−39
Feature trans-
mission based[11]
0.628× higher
error rate 64× 0 Not reported
We can see from Equation (16) and (17) that neither Ocomp,dp nor Ocomp,dev is related to the depth of the neural
network. On the other hand, we can also see that the computational overhead grows quadratically with the size of
input data m and output feature n, making MoLe more suitable for low dimensional tasks. To put it in perspective, the
computational overhead proportion to the original network is 9% for VGG-16 network on CIFAR dataset, and 10× for
ResNet-152 network on ImageNet dataset.
Data transmission overhead. Since Dr and Tr has the same dimension, the data transmission overhead Odata is
determined by the size of Cac, i.e., Odata = (αm2)2 or the number of elements in Cac. Odata is irrelevant to either
the size of the dataset or the depth of the neural network. For CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100, Odata is 5.12% to the
whole dataset. For a larger dataset like ImageNet, Odata is merely about 1%. The performance penalty and overhead
comparison of MoLe and other related methods on VGG-16 network and CIFAR-10 dataset is summarized in Table 2.
6 Conclusion
In this work, we propose Mole – an efficient and secure method for deep learning data delivery. MoLe includes two
components: data morphing and Aug-Conv layer. Data morphing generates unrecognizable morphed data with low and
adjustable computational cost, and Aug-Conv layer compensates the morphed data incurred performance degradation
of neural networks. Quantitative analysis on security and overhead shows that MoLe offers a very strong security
protection with low overheads.
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APPENDIX A. PROOFS
Proof for lemma 1
Both A and B can be seen as points in an N -dimensional (N -D) space. Since both of them are unit l2-norm matrices,
they land on the surface of an N -D hypersphere. Figure 2 shows the 2-D projection of the N -D space.
A
𝑅 = 1
B0 B1
d d
O
Figure 2: 2-D projection of the N -D space
B0 and B1 are the borders of B which suffice |A− B|2 ≤ d ≤ 1. In the N -D space, assume the surface area of O is
SO, surface area of hypersurface B˙0AB1 is SB0AB1 , then:
P1 =
SB0AB1
SO
. (18)
Now we make an auxiliary sphere A with rA = d, as shown in figure 3:
A
𝑅 = 1
B0 B1
d d
O
C
Figure 3: Add the auxiliary sphere
In the 2-D projection, we can see that the length of arc B˙0AB1 is shorter than the length of arc B˙0CB1, as the latter is
further away from the straight line B0B1. Similarly, in the N -D space, the area of hypersurface B˙0AB1 is smaller than
the area of hypersurface B˙0CB1. Therefore, we have:
P1 ≤ SB0CB1
SO
≤
1
2SA
SO
. (19)
Here SA is the surface area of A. The N -D hypersphere surface area can be calculated as:
SN (R) =
2pi
N+1
2
Γ(N+12 )
RN−1. (20)
Substitute Equation (20) into Equation (19), we can get:
P1 ≤ 1
2
dN−1. (21)
Therefore, lemma 1 is proven.
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Proof for lemma 2
The sum of squared error (SSE) between Dr andDr can be calculated by:
S(Dr,Dr) = (Dr −Dr)T · (Dr −Dr). (22)
Substitute Dr = Tr ·M−1 andDr = Tr ·G into Equation 22 we can get:
S(Dr,Dr) = (Tr ·M−1 − Tr ·G)T · (Tr ·M−1 − Tr ·G)
=
(
Tr · (M−1 −G))T · (Tr · (M−1 −G))
= TrT · (M−1 −G)T · (M−1 −G) · Tr.
(23)
For easy representation, assert K = (M−1 −G)T · (M−1 −G). Equation 23 can be simplified as:
S(Dr,Dr) = TrT · (M−1 −G)T · (M−1 −G) · Tr = TrT ·K · Tr. (24)
Since K is a symmetrical matrix, it can be factorized into the product of unitary matrix and diagonal matrix like:
K = PT ·Λ · P. (25)
Here P is an unitary matrix and Λ is a diagonal matrix. Substitute Equation (25) into Equation (23), we have:
S(Dr,Dr) = TrT · PT ·Λ · P · Tr
=
N ′−1∑
i=0
Λii(P · Tr)2i .
(26)
Here N ′ is the number of elements in Tr. Since Tr is the linear transformation of a data from real-world, we assume
the elements in Tr is approximately independent and identically distributed, then we can get:
N ′−1∑
i=0
E
(
(P · Tr)2i
)
= 1. (27)
Here E is the expectation. Additionally, based on Equation (26), we can have:
E
(
S(Dr,Dr)) = N ′−1∑
i=0
ΛiiE
(
(P · Tr)2i
)
. (28)
Combining equation 27 and 28, we can get:
N ′−1∑
i=0
E
(
(P · Tr)2i
)
= 1
⇒ E((P · Tr)2i ) = 1N ′
⇒ E(S(Dr,Dr)) = ∑N ′−1i=0 Λii
N ′
=
Tr(Λ)
N ′
.
(29)
Here Tr is the trace of matrix, i.e., the sum of all diagonal elements. According to Equation (25), Tr(Λ) = Tr(K).
Therefore we can represent Tr(Λ) using G and M−1 as:
Tr(Λ) = Tr(K) =
N ′′−1∑
i=0
(M−1 −G)Ti · (M−1 −G)i. (30)
Here (M−1 − G)i denotes the column vector in (M−1 − G) with the index of i, N ′′ is the number of columns in
(M−1 −G). According to the rules of d2r, N ′′ = N ′. Substitute Equation (30) into Equation (29), we have:
E
(
S(Dr,Dr)) = 1
N ′
N ′−1∑
i=0
(M−1 −G)Ti · (M−1 −G)i
=
1
N ′
N ′−1∑
i=0
N ′−1∑
j=0
(M−1 −G)2i,j .
(31)
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At this point, we have successfully established the relation between S(Dr,Dr) and (M−1 −G). Additionally, we scale
the norm of M−1 and G to N ′ as:
N ′−1∑
i=0
N ′−1∑
j=0
(M−1i,j )
2 =
N ′−1∑
i=0
N ′−1∑
j=0
G2i,j = N
′. (32)
The normalized M−1 and G can be considered as two points in a hypersphere with the radius of R =
√
N ′. The l2
distance d between M−1 and G is:
d =
Ã
N ′−1∑
i=0
N ′−1∑
j=0
(M−1norm −Gnorm)2i,j . (33)
Combining Equation (31) and Equation (33), we can get:
d =
»
E
(
S(Dr,Dr))N ′. (34)
According to the relation between SSE and root mean square error, E
(
S(Dr,Dr)) = E2rms(Dr,Dr)N ′ ≤ σ2N ′/√N .
Since N is the number of elements in M and N ′ is the number of elements in Tr, we have
√
N = N ′, and therefore
E
(
S(Dr,Dr)) ≤ σ2. Equation (34) can now be written as:
d ≤ σ
√
N ′. (35)
Re-scale the space by the factor of 1√
N ′
, we can get d ≤ σ and R = 1.
Additionally, the dimension of the space equals the total number of elements in M−1, which is N . Therefore,
P2 = P1(d = σ) and lemma 2 is proven.
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APPENDIX B. ADDITIONAL FIGURES
Figure 4 shows the data unrolling process for d2r.
……
Original data
D
Unrolled data vector
Dr
Figure 4: Unrolling data for d2r.
Figure 5 shows the change in shapes of matrices when using d2r to compute a convolutional layer.
conv
D
α, (m × m) 
K
α, β, (p × p) 
=
F
β, (n × n) 
d2r:
Dr
(1× αm2) 
·
C
(αm2× βn2) 
=
Fr
(1× βn2) 
convolution:
Figure 5: Using d2r to compute convolutional layer.
Figure 6 shows an example of diagonally scaling M′ with the shape of 2× 2 to compose M with the shape of 6× 6.
core morphing 
matrix M′
morphing matrix M
Figure 6: An example of diagonally scaling
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Figure 7 shows the how change of κ affects the privacy-preserving effectiveness of data morphing. Structural similarity
(SSIM) index in the figure is a commonly used method to evaluate the visual similarity between two images. SSIM
index ranges from 0 to 1, and a larger value means higher visual similarity.
Girl Cat
Mean
SSIM
Original
128 × 128
1
κ = 6,144
q = 8
0.93
κ = 1,536
q = 32
0.77
κ = 16
q = 3,072
0.24
κ = 1
q = 49,152
0.02
Figure 7: κ and privacy-preserving effectiveness.
Figure 8 shows the recovered photos with different privacy reservation limits σ. It shows that σ = 0.5 is a very strict
requirement for privacy-preserving.
Privacy
Reservation
Original σ = 5E-5 σ = 5E-4 σ = 5E-3 0.5
Cat photo
Figure 8: Cat photos with different privacy reservation limits.
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